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Abstract
 
In a recent article,the writer has broached the topic of identifying distinctions in the modes
 
of commentarial discourse within the exegetical works of the Korean scholiast Wonhyo
(617-686),taking note of(1)a rational/logical form of discourse that attempts to elucidate
 
the point of a passage ― and especially to resolve any doctrinal problems contained
 
therein,using rational argumentation,and (2)an intuitive,poetic,form of discourse that
 
emphasizes the fact that the ultimate Buddhist truth is inapprehensible through discrimina-
tory thought. In that paper, attention was paid primarily to the intuitive/poetic mode,
which tends to be seen in the opening and closing portions of his commentaries― or in
 
works, or portions of works― that deal primarily with issues of faith. In that paper,
examples were drawn primarily from his commentaries on the Awakening of Maha?ya?na
 
Faith and the Sutra of Immeasurable Life.This paper advances that discussion by paying
 
attention to the rational/logical strain of his writings, which is clearly of equal and
 
possibly even greater importance.Here we look at passages from two of his works that
 
both make use of logic,yet which also subject logic itself to a critique in terms of testing
 
the limitations of its applicability in resolving the most fundamental of religious truths.
1. Introduction
 
In a recent article,in which I discussed Wonhyo’s (元曉 617-686)Doctrinal Essentials of the
 
Su?tra of Immeasurable Life (Muryangsu gyeong jong-yo),??I attempted to show how two distinct
 
modes of discourse can be identiﬁed in Wonhyo’s commentaries.These are:(1)a rational/logical
 
form of discourse that attempts to elucidate the point of a passage― and especially to resolve
 
any doctrinal problems contained therein― using clear rational argumentation.Prose written in
 
this mode usually includes citations from scriptural sources that operate with a similar rational
 
discourse― a good example being basic Yoga?ca?ra works such as the Yoga?ca?rabhu?mi-s?a?stra,etc.
(2) an intuitive, poetic, form of discourse that tends to emphasize the fact that the ultimate
 
Buddhist truth is inapprehensible through discriminatory thought.When writing in this mode,
Wonhyo usually concludes with the pronouncement that absolute faith is the only ultimate
 
solution to the resolution of doctrinal problems.In a characteristic turn in Wonhyo’s commentar-
ial work,after examining a certain doctrine,or set of doctrines at length in a systematic and
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rational manner,he will declare that the ultimate understanding regarding a Buddhist truth can
 
only be met when one fully abandons the words,lets go of discriminating thought,and approaches
 
the Buddhist teachings with deep faith.
Soon after publishing the above-mentioned article on the Muryangsu gyeong jong-yo,I had the
 
opportunity to work with two more of Wonhyo’s texts― texts that deal more directly with,and
 
make greater use of logic.The ﬁrst is the Simmun hwajaeng non (十門和諍論 “Ten Approaches
 
to the Reconciliation of Doctrinal Disputes”).??This is a treatise in which Wonhyo examines a
 
series of seminal Buddhist doctrinal problems through various forms of logical argumentation
 
and analysis.Although it is unfortunately only available in fragmentary form,from the way we
 
ﬁnd it cited in Korean historical records,it seems as though it may have been regarded by early
 
scholars as his magnum opus.??
The second text is unfortunately also available only in fragmentary form.This is the Pan
 
biryang non ( 比量論 “Critique of Inference”;hereafter PBN)which is,as the title suggests,a
 
work that tests the application of Buddhist logic.However,instead of working with the stock
 
epistemological arguments of Indian philosophy that are usually presented in the logic texts,such
 
as discussions of the nature of sound and other physical phenomena, Wonhyo puts both the
 
process of formal logic,as well as the doctrines themselves to the test through the treatment of
 
several of the most thorny problems of East Asian Maha?ya?na― problems such as those of the
 
Yoga?ca?ra ﬁve natures; the application of the emptiness theory in the context of everyday
 
discourse― and the topic that is always ﬁrst and foremost for Wonhyo― the matter of the
 
possibility of becoming a buddha.Thus,while attempting to fully un pack the doctrinal issues at
 
hand,the PBN also represents an exercise in testing the eﬀectiveness of logic itself in addressing
 
such issues.We will examine the arguments of the texts in detail below,but ﬁrst,let us brieﬂy
 
review the history of the Buddhist logic tradition,focusing on the way it was received in East
 
Asia.
2.Buddhist Logic in East Asia
 
The term“Buddhist logic”refers most commonly to the Sanskrit term hetu-vidya?,but it also
 
can refer,according to the context,to prama?n･a,nya?ya (which means“logic,”but is also the name 
of a speciﬁc non-Buddhist school in India), and anuma?na (which, more strictly interpreted,
indicates a speciﬁc mode of knowing).The Buddhist logic tradition,as compared with various
“religious schools”of Buddhism,developed as an integral part of the overall philosophical milieu
 
in India, where hetu-vidya constituted one of the ﬁve branches of Indian science 五明. Thus,
so-called“Buddhist”logic was cultivated as a common ground for engaging in debate with other
 
Indian philosophical schools,such as Sam･khya,Vais?es･ika,Veda?nta and so forth.
Wonhyo and Logic 2
 
Although Buddhist logic is an epistemologically-oriented philosophical discipline rather than
 
a school of religion,most of its main early ﬁgures are Yoga?ca?ras.The earliest references to this
 
speciﬁc terminology are found in the texts of the Yoga?ca?ra founders Asan・ga無著 and Vasuband-
hu世親 (both 4th c.),with the most important later developments coming from the Yoga?ca?ra
 
philosopher Digna?ga陳那 (ca.480-540).According to tradition,the founder of Indian logic was
 
Aks･apa?da足目 (d.u.),who formulated the Nya?ya school,and in earlier stages Buddhist logicians 
also referred to their craft by the term nya?ya.Over time,however,Buddhists came to refer to
 
their system as hetu-vidya,which becomes distinguished into early logic古因明 (pre-Digna?ga)and
 
new logic新因明 (Digna?ga and afterward).??
The main purpose for constructing this formal system of logic was to apply it as the structure
 
for inter-school debate ― concerning, of course, philosophical principles. To this end, it was
 
well-used in ancient India,and developed extensively in Tibet.However,while a number of logic
 
texts were transmitted to and studied in East Asia,no signiﬁcant “live-debate”tradition devel-
oped in East Asia,comparable,for example,to that of the Gelukpa school in Tibet.
The three part syllogism is laid out by Digna?ga in his Nya?yamukha (”Gateway to Logic”),
translated by Xuanzang as因明正理門論本 (T 1628)and by Yijing as因明正理門論 (T 1629).??A
 
central part of the discourse of this tradition is the setting up of clear guidelines as to the various
 
properties contained in a valid proof.There are extensive and detailed explanations of the classes
 
and types of logical errors,which can lead to conclusions that are indeterminate for diﬀerent
 
types of reasons,conclusions that are unsupportable,contradictory,irrelevant,and so forth.To
 
clarify what kinds of combinations of semantic properties generate these diﬀerent possibilities,
the logicians compiled tables of fallacies,which became standardized into a set, including nine
 
fallacies in the thesis宗九過,fourteen fallacies in the reason因十四過 (which are analyzed in nine
 
ways九句因),and ten in the example喩十過 ― totaling thirty-three.??
The deﬁnitive work by Digna?ga mentioned above,as well as the Nya?yapraves?a因明入正理論
(T 1630)by Digna?ga’s student Śam･karasva?min商 羅主 (6c.)are the three most important source 
texts for Buddhist logic transmitted in East Asia.While these logic texts actually constitute only
 
a tiny fraction of the amount of texts that Xuanzang玄 (600-664)brought back from India,they
 
nonetheless succeeded in attracting a good deal of attention in certain circles of the East Asian
 
Yoga?ca?ra tradition,as one can seen from browsing the titles of the numerous commentaries on
 
logic listed in Ono’s Bussho kaisetsu daijiten.Unfortunately,most of these commentaries are not
 
extant.In terms of the dissemination of Buddhist logic in East Asia,two of Xuanzang’s students
 
played a critical role:Kuiji窺基??(632-682)and Huizhao慧沼 (650-714),who in their works also
 
include the opinions of many other contemporary scholars. In Korea, at least ﬁfteen logic
 
commentaries were composed,mostly on the Nya?yamukha,but the only text that remains among
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these is Wonhyo’s Critique of Inference.In Japan,commentarial work on logic was also exten-
sive,with much earlier inﬂuence coming from the Hosso?scholar Zenju善珠 (727-797).??
For the tradition of Buddhist logic overall, Dharmakı?rti 法 is also important as the
 
inﬂuential successor to Digna?ga.Unfortunately,his great treatises,such as the Nya?yabindu and
 
the Prama?n･ava?rttika were never translated into Chinese,and thus his inﬂuence in East Asia was 
minimal as compared with that which he held in India,and later,Tibet.
3.Background of The Two Texts
(Ten Approaches to The Resolution of Doctrinal Disputes)
The one term that is used more than any other to describe Wonhyo’s distinctive approach to
 
scholarly commentarial work,is that of hwajaeng 和諍 or the“resolution of doctrinal disputes.”
As a methodological approach,hwajaeng refers to Wonhyo’s ubiquitous habit of taking ostensibly
 
variant or conﬂicting Buddhist doctrinal positions,investigating them exhaustively until identify-
ing the precise point at which their variance occurs, and then showing how diﬀerences in
 
fundamental background,motivation,or sectarian bias lead to the production of such apparent
 
contradictions.Wonhyo carries out this process repeatedly,in every extant commentary,in every
 
essay and treatise― to an extent,to my knowledge,not seen in the works of any other East Asian
 
scholar or exegete.Thus,it is not surprising that he was known in East Asia as the“reconciler
 
of doctrinal disputes.”
In his view of Buddhism as a vast, interpenetrated doctrinal system,Wonhyo would not
 
tolerate loose ends,and so,when perceiving apparent disagreements in certain strata or families
 
of texts, he could not be satisﬁed with stopping at some arbitrary point and constructing a
 
doctrinal classiﬁcation (pangyo 教)scheme in order to close the case.??
The Simmun hwajaeng non (hereafter SHN ), for which we unfortunately only have frag-
ments from the beginning portion, is one of Wonhyo’s very few works that is not actually a
 
commentary,and is not composed for the purpose of resolving a singular doctrinal theme.It is
 
rather a methodological exercise based on a combined application of Ma?dhyamika and Digna?gan
 
logic,interwoven with the motifs of the major Maha?ya?na scriptures,including the Lotus Su?tra,
Nirva?n･a Su?tra,Yoga?ca?rabhu?mi-s?a?stra,Prajn?a?pa?ramita?Su?tra,and so on.As in his other works,his 
point is to show how ostensibly conﬂicting doctrinal problems stand up under the scrutiny of a
 
rigorous logical examination.
(Critique of Inference)
Like the SHN,the Pan biryang non (hereafter,PBN)is only available in fragmentary form,
thus greatly limiting what we can deﬁnitively say about the text’s arguments.What we can say
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about this text,is that it seems suﬃciently clear from the title and the thrust of the discussion,
that Wonhyo is,while applying to the tools of Buddhist logic in the examination of fundamental
 
Buddhist problems,also attempting to test the limits of the hetuvidya project itself―at least in the
 
way that it has been received and presented up to that moment in time by his inﬂuential
 
contemporaries in Chang’an―Xuanzang,Kuiji,Huizhao,et.al.His ﬁnal exercise in applying the
 
tables of fallacies to the problem of innate buddhahood and the Yoga?ca?ra ﬁve natures seems to
 
be intended― at least in part― to show how the problem of buddha-potential cannot be plumbed
 
by Digna?ga’s argument structure.It does not take much to imagine that Wonhyo might take an
 
ambivalent approach to hetuvidya?,given the strong non-conceptual faith orientation expressed at
 
the conclusion of virtually all of his extant works.On the other hand,it is unlikely that Wonhyo
 
took a one-sidedly negative view toward logic,given his extensive usage of its terminology in
 
other works,along with the fact that he also wrote another full commentary on the topic.
4.Comparative Structure of the Two Texts
 
The SHN is composed as a series of arguments examining ten fundamental issues of
 
Buddhist metaphysics,epistemology,and soteriology.The discussions remaining in this fragmen-
tary text include:
(1) An argument dealing with an array of problems inherent in delivering a congruent
 
explanation of the categories of existence and emptiness.This discussion is carried out
 
largely in a Ma?dhyamika style,expressed in Wonhyo’s own distinctive ﬂavor.
(2)A longer and more complex inquiry into the Yoga?ca?ra three natures of cognition.These
 
arguments are carried out with frequent references to the rules of Buddhist logic.
(3)A topic that can be found in many of his other writings― that of the problems inherent
 
in claims of either presence or lack of Buddha-nature in some or all sentient beings.These
 
are argued by presenting the positions of adherents of both positions,after which Wonhyo
 
gives his own analysis.Here,Wonhyo also often makes a case for invalidity of a given
 
argument based on rules of Buddhist logic.This is the discussion we will be looking at in
 
this paper.
(4) A discussion of the meanings of the two kinds of selﬂessness: that of persons and
 
phenomena (dharmas).
The structure of the PBN is similar to the SHN,in that both are composed as a series of
 
arguments which test fundamental Buddhist doctrinal problems.In the SHN,however,Wonhyo
 
writes more freely,not constraining himself by the rules of a single formal system of logic.He
 
does cite rules and terms from Buddhist logic frequently, but he is not operating exclusively
 
within that formal framework,as he also cites,for example,the principle of the four and eight
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negations of Madhyamaka, as well as using plain logical reasoning that is not related to the
 
fallacy tables of hetuvidya.In the PBN,on the other hand,he is working exclusively within the
 
framework of Buddhist logic(or,at least as he understands it),with two apparent aims:(1)To
 
use this logical tool as a distinctive way to delve into these doctrinal problems,and(2)to test the
 
tool itself,to see how well it really works,when faced with some of the more elusive conundrums
 
of Maha?ya?na doctrine.The list of topics covered in the text is as follows(numbering is as given
 
in the extant fragment,which starts from the number 7.):
7.Problems inherent in the Pure Land doctrine.
8.Problems with the Yoga?ca?ra theory of the Four Parts of Cognition(wherein,using a logical
 
argument,Wonhyo rejects the fourth part as being redundant).
9-10.Examination of the nature of the relationship of the eighth (a?laya)consciousness with
 
the seven forthcoming consciousnesses,with special attention to the standpoint of the
 
Cheng weishi lun.
11-12.Examination of the content of some of the fallacies of Indian logic itself,through the
 
traditional Buddhist vs.Mı?ma?m･sika?arguments regarding the nature of sound,etc.
13.Problems concerning the ﬁve natures and innate Buddhahood.
14.Emptiness of persons and phenomena.
15.Problems dealing with identity and diﬀerence that undermine the application of logic.
There is actually more overlap between the content of the two works than would be indicated
 
by these topic headings alone,but direct overlap is to be seen between topic(3)in the SHN and
 
section heading #13 in the PBN,as well as SHN (4)and PBN #14.In this paper,we will limit
 
ourselves to the discussion of the ﬁrst set,but the reader should know that the second set― the
 
discussion of the matter of the selﬂessness of persons and dharmas is an equally rich and
 
interesting one.Hopefully,I’ll have the opportunity to deal with it in a future paper.
Let us now begin with the treatment of the issue the innate natures of sentient beings as given
 
in the PBN,which is considerably shorter.
5.Problems Concerning the Existence of Buddha-nature
 
Critique of Inference:Innate Potential and the Five Natures
 
Preliminary Note:It is important to keep in mind when reading the following passages that the
 
arguments for the presence or lack of buddha-nature are being carried out exclusively from the
 
perspective of the negative and positive properties (同品,異品)of the examples喩 and evidence
因 of the argument,rather than being based on a wholistic,commonsense,or faith-based impres-
sion gleaned from the argument as a whole.
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十三。或有爲難 五種之性、立比量言。無性有情必當作佛、以有 心故、如有性者。 此因不定、故
成不難。爲如諸佛以有心故、非當作佛、爲如 菩薩以有心故、必當作佛。前別立因言 以未成佛之
有情故。此因亦有他不定過。 爲如菩薩種性 爲如決定二乘。
［HBJ 1.816b］ 13. Some raise an objection over the ﬁve kinds of innate potential for
 
awakening,making this inference:Sentient beings who do not have the innate capacity for
 
awakening are sure to become buddhas,because they have mind,and in this respect they are
 
like those who do have the innate capacity for awakening. The evidence in this proof is
 
inconclusive,???and so its proof does not draw an objection.Or suppose one asserts that all
 
the buddhas have mind,and so they do not become buddhas;or suppose one asserts that all
 
the bodhisattvas have mind,and so they do become buddhas.The prior-speciﬁed evidence is
 
based on the deﬁnition of sentient beings as those who have not yet become awakened.This
 
reason also contains other faults of inconclusiveness. Are sentient beings who are not
 
enlightened to be considered as having the bodhisattva nature?Or are they of the nature
 
determined for the two vehicles?
若爲避此 更立宗言 。無性有情決定二乘、皆 當作佛。以未成佛有情攝故、猶如菩薩。此有求難故
成不定。如是三人 非當作佛、 以無大乘無漏種子、而非菩薩種性攝故。如木石等諸無情物。
In order to avoid this diﬃculty,one proposes that sentient beings lacking the potential for
 
awakening and those determined for the two vehicles will all become buddhas.Since those
 
who have not yet become buddhas are included in the category of sentient beings,they are
 
the same as bodhisattvas.Since problems can be found［in this kind of logic］,the argument
 
is inconclusive.If these three categories of beings do not become buddhas,it is because they
 
lack the pure seeds of the great vehicle and do not have the innate potential of the bod-
hisattvas.They are like non-sentient objects such as trees,rocks and so on.
又、有比量相違過失。謂五種性中餘四種性 地獄時、應有四德許作佛故、如菩薩姓。許則違教。
不許違理、此違自語比量過也。五量。
This argument also contains a fallacy of contradictory inference.For example,implying that
 
among the ﬁve kinds of potential for awakening, when the other four［non-awakened］
lineages fall into hell, they must have the four virtues???so it is accepted that they will
 
become awakened,like the lineage of the bodhisattvas.If we admit this,then we commit the
 
fallacy of contradicting the tenets of our own tradition,???and if we do not admit this,then
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we commit the fallacy of contradicting our own statement違自語過.???(Fifth inference)
Simmun hwajaeng non:Do All Sentient Beings Possess the Buddha-nature?
又、彼經言「衆生佛性不一不二。諸佛平等、猶如 空。一切衆生同共有之。」 又、下文云「一
切衆生同有佛性。皆同一乘、一因、一果、同一甘露。一切當得常 我淨、是故一味。」依此經文、
若立一分無佛性者 則違大乘平等法性、同 體大悲如海一味。 又、若立言定有無性一切界差別可得
故。如火性中無水性者。
他亦立云、定皆有性。一味性平等可得故。如諸 色聚悉有大種性。則有決定相違過失。又、若立
云、定有無性、由法爾故者、他亦立云、定無 無性、由法爾故、是亦決定相違過失。
Furthermore,the［Maha?parinirva?n･a-］su?tra says:“Sentient beings and the buddha-nature are 
neither the same nor diﬀerent.All buddhas are the same,just like space.All sentient beings
 
share together in this same nature.”???Again,a passage below［in the same su?tra］says:
All sentient beings possess the same nature as the buddhas.All are［carried］in the same one
 
vehicle,with the same cause［buddha-nature］, the same results［enlightenment］, and the
 
experience of the taste of the same single sweet nectar. All will attain constancy, bliss,
self-stability,and purity.Therefore it is［said to be］of a single taste.???
Taking into account the standpoint of this scripture,if one suggests that there is one group
 
of sentient beings that lack the buddha-nature,this would be at odds with the great vehicle’s
 
advocacy of equality in nature,and the great compassion［of the buddhas and bodhisattvas］
based on their realization of the essential commonality of their minds with those of sentient
 
beings,which,like the ocean,is of a single taste.Some maintain that there are people who
 
lack the buddha-nature based on the fact that it is readily observable that there are distinc-
tions among［phenomena］in all worlds.For example,the nature of ﬁre lacks the nature of
 
water.
On the other hand, there are those who advocate that everyone deﬁnitely possesses the
 
buddha-nature,since such phenomena are observable as［the ocean］having a single taste［no
 
matter where you might test it］. It is like all compounds of coarse materiality having the
 
nature of the gross elements.???This is a fallacy wherein separately valid reasoning supports
 
contradictory conclusions.One might propose that there are deﬁnitely sentient beings that
 
lack［buddha-］nature,because that’s just the way things are,while someone else says that
 
there are deﬁnitely none who lack the［buddha-］nature,because that’s just the way things
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are.This also constitutes a fallacy wherein diﬀering,but individually valid reasons lead to
 
contradictory conclusions.
Comment:Here Wonhyo is presenting a couple of sample arguments that were circulating in his
 
era for and against the proposition of the possession of Buddhahood based on examples that can
 
be seen in the material world. On one hand, we know that clear qualitative diﬀerences are
 
observable between things.Yet on the other hand,there are phenomena that seem to provide an
 
example of a single pervasive nature,such as that of the single salty taste of the ocean.Wonhyo
 
then cites simultaneous proposing of both arguments as an example of one of the common
 
fallacies documented in Buddhist logic.
The Argument for the Existence of Sentient Beings who Lack Buddha-nature
執有無性論者、通曰經言、衆生悉有心者、汎 一切有性無性未得已得諸有情也。凡其有心當得菩
提者、於中簡取有性未得之有心也。
Those who hold to the view that there are sentient beings who lack［buddha-］nature
 
interpret the line of the［Nirva?n･a-］su?tra that says “all sentient beings have mind...”as 
referring to all sentient beings,whether or not they have buddha-nature,or whether or not
 
they have attained enlightenment. In the phrase “all those who possess mind will attain
 
enlightenment,”they take “possess mind”to refer especially to those who have buddha-
nature but who have not yet attained enlightenment.
設使一切有心皆當得者。已得菩提者、亦應當得耶。故知非謂一切有心皆當得也。又言、猶如 空
一切同有者、是就理性、非 行性也。又 、一因一果乃至一切當得常 我淨者。是約少分一切、
非 一切一切。如是諸文皆得善通。
Suppose all those who possess mind will attain enlightenment. How can those who have
 
already attained enlightenment also［newly］attain enlightenment?Hence we know that this
 
does not mean that all those who possess mind will attain enlightenment.It is also said“all
 
possess it equally, just like space.”This is from the perspective of［buddha-］nature in
 
principle,and does not explain actualized［buddha-nature］.It is also said“There is a single
 
cause and a single result,”as well as “all［sentient beings］will attain constancy, bliss,
self-stability,and purity.”This is from the perspective of a limited kind of totality,rather
 
than an absolute kind of totality.These passages can be skillfully interpreted in this way.
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Comment:Basically the argument is that when such scriptures as the Nirva?n･a Su?tra use the 
phrase“all who have mind,”it obviously can’t mean everyone,as in the case of buddhas,who
 
have minds,but who are already enlightened,and thus cannot be counted among those who
 
are to attain enlightenment henceforth.The argument is also made that this statement is a
 
sort of idealistic position― not something that happens in actual practice.???Again, this
 
argument is being made fully through the framework of logic.
又、若立云由法爾故、無無性者、則衆生有盡。是爲大過。如前所立由法爾故有無性者則無是失。
故知是似決定相違、而實不成相違過失。如有立言火非 性、由法爾故。又、有立言火是 性由
法爾故。 此似決定相違、而實無此過失。以火性是熱 實非 故。無性有情道理亦爾。
If someone asserts that there are none who lack buddha-nature because that’s the way things
 
are,this implies that sentient beings are ﬁnite in number,which constitutes a major breach
 
of logic.The prior assertion that there are sentient beings that lack buddha-nature because
 
that’s the way things are,does not make this error.Hence we know that although this appears
 
to be a fallacy wherein diﬀering but individually valid reasons lead to contradictory conclu-
sions,it actually does not constitute a fallacy of contradiction.It is like saying that ﬁre has
 
no nature of wetness because that’s the way things are,and then again saying that ﬁre does
 
have the nature of wetness because that’s the way things are.While this appears to a fallacy
 
wherein diﬀering but individually valid reasons lead to contradictory conclusions,it actually
 
is not such a fallacy.This is because since the nature of ﬁre is heat, and is certainly not
 
wetness.The argument for there being sentient beings who lack buddha-nature works the
 
same way.
問。若立後師義、是 云何通。如顯揚論云。「云何唯現在世非般涅槃法。不應理故。謂不應言於
現在世。雖非般涅槃法、於餘生中、復可轉爲般涅槃法。何以故。無般涅槃種 性法故。」
Question:If we take the position of the latter scholar, how can it be interpreted?As the
 
Prakarana?ryava?ca-s?a?stra?says:“How could it be that it is only in the present lifetime that
 
there is no attainment of ﬁnal nirva?n･a?It does not make sense.［...］This means that one 
should not say’in the present lifetime.’Even if there is no such thing as attainment of ﬁnal
 
ni rva?n･a［in the present lifetime］, in subsequent lives the dharma of ﬁnal nirva?n･a can be 
developed. Why is this so?Because［otherwise］there would be no such thing as innate
 
potential for attaining nirva?n･a.”
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Comment:From here,Wonhyo pursues an argument based on the problematic nature of ﬁnitude/
inﬁnitude,ﬁelds of merit,and the deﬁnition of a buddha as one who saves sentient beings.
「又、若於此生先已積集順解 分善根、何故不名般涅槃法。若於此生都未積集、云何後生能般涅
槃。是故 ( 上第十五張)定有非般涅槃種性有情。」 伽論中亦同此 。又、若一切皆當作佛、則
衆生、雖多、必有終盡、以無不成佛者故。是則諸佛利他功德亦盡。
Furthermore,if one has already accumulated the good roots conducive to liberation in this
 
life,why would this not be called the［potential for］ﬁnal nirva?n･a?If,in this life one has not 
at all accumulated the good roots conducive to liberation,how could it be possible to bring
 
about ﬁnal nirva?n･a in a subsequent life?In this case,there deﬁnitely would have to be sentient 
beings who do not possess the innate potential for nirva?n･a.???
The Yoga?ca?rabhu?mi-s?a?stra also has the same kind of teaching.Furthermore,if everyone will
 
become a buddha,then sentient beings,even though numerous,are certainly ﬁnite in number,
since there are none who will not become buddhas.If this is the case,then the buddhas’merit
 
of bringing beneﬁt to others is also ﬁnite.
又、若衆生必有盡者、後成佛、則無所化。所化無故、利他行闕行闕成佛。不應道理。又、若 一
切盡當作佛而言衆生無永盡 者、則爲自語相違過失。以永無盡者永不成佛故。
Also,if sentient beings are deﬁnitely ﬁnite in number,and later become buddhas,then there
 
will be no one to teach.With no one to teach,the activities taken up by the buddhas for the
 
beneﬁt of others will be deﬁcient.［The notion of］becoming a buddha with deﬁciency in
 
activities［for the beneﬁt of others］is not logical.Or, if one says that all sentient beings
 
without exception become buddhas,yet there is no end to them, then this constitutes the
 
logical breach of contradiction within one’s own words,since if there is no end to sentient
 
beings,it means that they never become buddhas.
又、如一佛一會能度百千萬億衆生今入涅槃、於衆生界漸損。以不若有漸損、則有終盡、有損無盡
不應理故。若無損者則無滅 度。有滅無損不應理故。如是進退終不可立。無同類故、其義不成。
Furthermore,when,in the course of the delivery of one sermon,one buddha causes billions
 
of sentient beings to enter nirva?n･a,there must be a gradual decrease in the number of sentient 
beings.Saying that it is not the case that if there is gradual decrease,then there is eventual
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exhaustion― in other words,reduction without exhaustion― is not logical. If there is no
 
reduction［in the number of sentient beings］,then there can’t be liberation,since liberation
 
without decrease［in the number of sentient beings］is not logical.This kind of advance and
 
regress ultimately can’t be accepted. Since there are no suitable analogies, the doctrine
 
cannot be accepted.
All Sentient Beings Possess Buddha-nature
執皆有性論者、通曰 彼新論文、正破執於先 來無性而後轉成有性義者。如彼文言 謂不應言於現在
世。雖非般涅槃法 於餘生 中可轉爲般涅槃法故。今所立宗本來有性、非謂先無而後轉成。故不
於彼論所 破。
Those who adhere to the position that all sentient beings possess buddha-nature interpret
 
saying that the new treatise (Prakarana?ryava?ca-s?a?stra) correctly refutes attachment to the
 
idea that sentient beings originally lack a［buddha-］nature but subsequently develop one.As
 
that text says:“This means that it should not be explained in terms of the present lifetime.
Even though they lack any［potential for］ﬁnal nirva?n･a,［potential for］ﬁnal nirva?n･a can be 
developed in subsequent lives.”???This presently-asserted thesis of innate buddha-nature does
 
not imply that sentient beings originally lacked it and will subsequently develop it.Therefore
 
it is not refuted by that thesis.
又、彼教意立無性者爲欲廻轉不求大乘之心。依無量時而作是 。由是密意故、不相違。彼救難云、
一切有心 皆當得者 佛亦有心 亦應更得者。是義不然。以彼經中自簡別故。彼云、衆生亦 爾悉皆
有心。凡有心者當得菩提。佛非衆生 何得相濫。
Furthermore,the teaching that proposes some beings to be lacking the nature of enlighten-
ment is established because they want to turn the minds of those who do not seek the great
 
vehicle. They make this teaching based on the limitlessness of time［required for attain-
ment］. From the perspective of this hidden implication, there is no contradiction. They
 
support their objection by saying,“all those who possess mind will attain enlightenment.”But
 
in that case,if the buddhas also have a mind,they should also re-attain enlightenment,and
 
this illogical.The Nirva?n･a su?tra itself speciﬁes this point,saying,“Sentient beings indeed all 
have a mind.All those who have a mind will attain enlightenment.”Since the buddhas are
 
not sentient beings,why should the two be conﬂated?
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又、彼難云。若皆作佛必有盡者、是難還着自無性宗。何者。如汝宗 無性有情本來具有法爾種子、
窮未來際 種子無盡。我 今問汝 隨汝意答。如是種子當言一切 皆當生果。當言亦有不生果者。若
言亦有 不生果者、不生果故則非種子。若言一切皆當生果者、是則種子雖多必有、終盡、 以無不
生果者故。若言雖一切種子皆當生果、而種子無窮故、無終盡而無自語相違過者。則應信受一切衆
生皆當成佛、而衆生無邊故無終盡。又、汝難云、有滅 無( 上第十六張)
Again,there was the objection that states“If all become buddhas then［the beings］must be
 
ﬁnite.”This objection ends up returning to the original thesis of the existence of beings who
 
lack the［buddha-］nature. Why?As your???［Yoga?ca?ra］school teaches, sentient beings
 
lacking the［buddha-］nature are endowed with seeds as part of their basic nature,and these
 
seeds are never exhausted throughout the inﬁnite future.I will now ask you question.Please
 
answer as you see ﬁt.Are these seeds to be explained as producing eﬀects in the future
 
without exception?Or should we say that there are some that do not produce eﬀects?If you
 
say that there are some that do not produce eﬀects,then if they do not produce eﬀects,they
 
are not seeds.???If we say that all will produce eﬀects, then even though these seeds are
 
certainly numerous, they will eventually be exhausted, since there are none that do not
 
produce eﬀects.If you say that even though all seeds will produce eﬀects,yet since seeds are
 
inﬁnite in number, then there is no exhaustion, and also no contradiction of one’s own
 
statement.Then,one acknowledges that all sentient beings will become buddhas,yet since
 
sentient beings are inﬁnite in number,they will never be exhausted.Again,you object,saying:
the existence of extinction has no［...］
Here the discussion breaks oﬀat the end of a textual fragment,but it is clear that Wonhyo
 
is in the midst of contesting the Yoga?ca?ra position of the existence of a class of sentient beings
 
without seeds of Buddhahood,but not by citing opposing Buddha-nature su?tras like the Nirva?n･a 
or Lotus,or tatha?gatagarbha texts like the Ratnagotravibha?ga. Rather, he is trying to expose a
 
logical consistency in the Yoga?ca?ra’s own doctrine.Thus,he is also choosing to stay within the
 
realm of logical argumentation.The earlier citation of the line from the Nirva?n･a Su?tra is not 
oﬀered as scriptural evidence,but as the object of the critique.Unfortunately we do not have the
 
closing portions of the SHN,so we do not know if at the very end he makes his usual shift to
 
poetic,faith-oriented discourse,but it would be hard to imagine that he doesn’t,given the degree
 
to which this approach pervades his other works.As an example, in the Critique of Inference,
despite the exclusive emphasis on logic that characterizes the text,Wonhyo concludes,after the
 
ﬁnal discussion of selﬂessness of person and phenomena,by saying:
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證成道理甚難思 自非笑却微易解 今依聖典 一隅 願通佛道流二世
The accomplishment of logic is exceedingly diﬃcult to conceive,
I laugh at my mistake― taking the subtle to be easily understandable.
Now,relying on the sacred teaching,I raise one corner［of the whole］,???
May the buddha-dharma circulate in this life and hereafter.
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Notes
⑴ Published as“Faith and the Resolution of the Four Doubts in Wonhyo’s Doctrinal Essentials of the
 
Su?tra of Immeasurable Life (Muryangsu gyeong jong’yo)”,Bulletin of To?yo? Gakuen University,Vol.15
(March 2007),pages 1-15.http://www.tyg.jp/tgu/school guidance/bulletin/k15/pdf/01muller.pdf
⑵ A translation of this text is available on my web site at http://www.hm.tyg.jp/?acmuller/kor-bud/
simmun hwajaeng non.html.
⑶ The Goseon-sa Seodang hwasang tapbi (Stele Inscription to Master Seodang［viz. Wonhyo］of
 
Goseon-sa;the earliest extant account of Wonhyo’s life,composed approximately 100 years after his
 
death),mentions only two works of Wonhyo’s:the SHN and the Hwaeom jong-yo (Thematic Essentials
 
of the Flower Garland Scripture;not extant).This information is found in“Goseon sa Seodang hwasang
 
tabpi”,in Cho Myeonggi,ed.,Wonhyo Daesa jeonjip (The Complete Works of Wonhyo)(Seoul:Boryon-
gak,1978),p.661,lines 10,13.This is a fact of some signiﬁcance,given the extensive inﬂuence of some
 
of his commentarial works,such as his commentaries on the Awakening of Faith,Nirva?n･a Su?tra,and
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Vajrasama?dhi Su?tra.
⑷ The earlier school of logic utilized a ﬁve-part syllogism that consisted of:
① 宗 (立宗,立義)pratijn?a?,the proposition;
② 因 (辯因)hetu,the reason;
③ 喩 (引喩,譬如)uda?haran･a,the example;
④ 合 (合譬)upanaya,the application;and
⑤ 結 (決定 )nigamana,the conclusion.
The new school of logic used the three part syllogism三支作法,which dropped the latter two parts
 
after Digna?ga deemed them to be redundant.
⑸ For a detailed article on the system presented in this text,mostly deﬁnitive for the East Asian logic
 
tradition,see the term能立 in the Digital Dictionary of Buddhism［DDB］.
⑹ These tables of fallacies are also elaborated in detail in the DDB.
⑺ It should be noted that Kuiji’s work is frequently criticized for major errors in understanding the
 
technical terminology of the tradition.
⑻ Some of these major logic commentaries are listed below in the bibliography. Further detailed
 
bibliographical information is provided in the DDB under the entry for能立.
⑼ There is,in fact,a pangyo system is ascribed to Wonhyo in Fazang’s Huayanjing tanxuan ji (T 1733.
35.111a23-27), but we should be careful not to take this as an indication that Wonhyo was seriously
 
involved in the work of doctrinal classiﬁcation,as:(1)nowhere else in Wonhyo’s extant corpus do we
 
ﬁnd anything indicating his having created, or having placed emphasis on a doctrinal classiﬁcation
 
system;(2)if we read Wonhyo’s works extensively,it would seem that his entire approach is antithetical
 
to the work of compartmentalization, and, most importantly, (3) in the ﬁnal lines of his Doctrinal
 
Essentials of the Nirva?n･a Su?tra (K. Yeolban jong-yo) he says:“You should know that the Buddha’s 
meaning is deep and profound without limit.So if you want［like Zhiyi］to divide the scriptural meaning
 
into four teachings,or limit the Buddha’s intent with ﬁve periods,then this is like using a snail shell to
 
scoop out the ocean,or trying to see the heavens through a narrow tube.”(HBJ 1.547a.18-21;T 1769.38.
255c5-6)
? In Buddhist logic“inconclusive”(Skt.anaika?ntika dos･a)is a technical term for the case where there 
is a fault in either the second or third among the three properties of the reason因三相 ― i.e.,either in
 
the reason deﬁnitely having the same qualities as the proposition (in the case of a positive example)同
品定有性,or the reason being totally devoid of the same qualities of the proposition (in the case of a
 
negative example), and thus the proposition cannot be validated.There are six kinds of fallacies of
 
inconclusiveness 六不定過. For the full list, see the DDB at: http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/
xpr-ddb.pl?4e.xml＋id(’b4e0d-5b9a-904e’)
? Probably referring to the four virtues taught in the Nirva?n･a Su?tra of permanence,bliss,personality,
and purity.
? K.chagyo sangwi (Skt.a?gama-viruddha)the third of the nine possible fallacies of the thesis(K.chong
 
kugwa).For the full list,see:DDB http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?5b.xml＋id(’b5b97-
4e5d-904e’)
? (Skt.svavacana-viruddha),the ﬁfth of the nine possible fallacies of the thesis.Please see the entry in
 
the DDB.
? T 374.12.539a9-10.
? T 374.12.559a21.
? Gross elements refers to the four main properties of physical sensation shared throughout the ancient
 
world:(1)the earth element(prthivı?dha?tu),which represents distinctions in softness and hardness;(2)the
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water element (ab-dha?tu), which represents distinctions in dryness and wetness;(3) the ﬁre element
(teja-dha?tu),which represents distinctions in coolness and warmth;(4)the wind element (va?yu?-dha?tu),
representing distinctions in movement and stillness.
? This is the same argument that Tagawa Shun’ei makes in the ninth chapter of Hajimete no yuishiki,
in his defense of the Yoga?ca?ra teaching of the ﬁve natures and icchantika doctrine.
? T 1602.31.581a4-5;a27-b4
? T 1602.31.581a27-29.
? The presence of the term“you”here lends some credence to the supposition that the SHN (and other
 
texts of Wonhyo)are at least in part records of lecture sessions.
? Especially since the metaphor of seeds refers speciﬁcally to the notion of“potentiality,”for which the
 
meaning of eﬀect is obviously implied.
? “Raise one corner” 一隅 comes from the Lunyu (Analects of Confucius)7-8:Confucius said:“If a
 
student is not eager,I won’t teach him;if he is not struggling with the truth,I won’t reveal it to him.If
 
I lift up one corner and he can’t come back with the other three,I won’t do it again.”
17 Wonhyo and Logic

